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Abstract: In this paper we present PeerCube, a DHT-based system that aims at min-
imizing performance penalties caused by high churn while preventing malicious peers from
subverting the system through collusion. This is achieved by i) applying a clustering strategy
to support quorum-based operations; ii) using a randomised insertion algorithm to reduce
the probability with which colluding Byzantine peers corrupt clusters, and; iii) leveraging
on the properties of PeerCube’s hypercube structure to allow operations to be successfully
handled despite the corruption of some clusters. Despite a powerful adversary that can
inspect the whole system and issue malicious join requests as often as it wishes, PeerCube
guarantees robust operations in O(logN) messages, with N the number of peers in the
system. Extended simulations validate PeerCube robustness.
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PeerCube: Infrastructure logique robuste aux collusions
et forte dynamicité
Résumé : Dans ce rapport nous proposons une infrastructure pour systèmes pair-à-pair
fortement dynamiques robuste aux intrusions coordonnèes
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1 Introduction
Research on the development of efficient peer-to-peer systems has recently received a lot of
attention. This has led to the construction of numerous structured peer-to-peer overlays
systems (e.g. CAN [15], Chord [23], Pastry [18], Tapestry [9] to cite some of them). All
these systems are based on distributed hash tables (DHTs) which partition an identifier space
among all the peers of the system. Structured overlays enjoy numerous important properties.
They are efficient, scalable, and tolerant to benign failures. However, less investigation has
been carried out for handling both very high churn and collusive behaviour issues. As pointed
out by Locher et al. [12], most proposed peer-to-peer overlays are highly satisfactory in terms
of efficiency, scalability and fault tolerance when evolving in weakly dynamic environments.
On the other hand, in the presence of very frequent connections/disconnections of peers, a
very large number of join and leave operations are locally triggered engendering accordingly
multiple and concurrent maintenance traffic. Ensuring routing tables consistency quickly
becomes unbearable, leading to misrouting, and to possible partitioning of the system. The
other fundamental issue faced by any practical open system is the inevitable presence of
malicious peers [21]. Guaranteeing the liveness of these systems requires their ability to self-
heal or at least to self-protect against this adversity. Malicious peers can devise complex
strategies to prevent peers from discovering the correct mapping between peers and data
keys. They can mount Sybil attacks [6] (i.e., an attacker generates numerous fake peers to
pollute the system), they can do routing-table poisoning (also called eclipse attacks [3, 21])
by having good peers redirecting outgoing links towards malicious ones, or they can simply
drop or re-route messages towards other malicious peers. They can magnify their impact by
colluding and coordinating their behaviour.
This paper presents PeerCube, a DHT-based system aiming at avoiding high churn from
impacting the performance of the system and at the same time at preventing malicious
behaviour (coordinated or not) from subverting the system. As many existing DHT-based
overlays, PeerCube is based on a hypercubic topology. PeerCube peers self-organise into
clusters whose interconnections form the hypercubic topology. Peers within each cluster are
classified into two categories, core members and spares, such that only the former ones are
actively involved in PeerCube operations. Thus only a fraction of churn affects the overall
topology of the hypercube. Defences against eclipse attacks are based on the observation
that malicious peers can more easily draw a successful adversarial strategy from a deter-
ministic algorithm than from a randomised one. We show that regardless of the adversarial
strategy colluders employ, the randomised insertion algorithm we propose guarantees that
the expected number of colluders in each routing table is minimal. Furthermore, by keeping
the number of core members per cluster small and constant, it allows to rely on the powerful
consensus building block to guarantee consistency of the routing tables despite Byzantine
peers. Finally, PeerCube takes advantage of independent and optimal length paths offered
by the hypercubic topology to decrease exponentially the probability of encountering a faulty
peer with the number of independent paths [22].
To summarise, PeerCube brings together research achievements in both “classical” dis-
tributed systems and open large scale systems (Byzantine consensus, clustering, distributed
hash tables) so that it efficiently deals with collusion and churn. For the best of our knowl-
edge this work is the first one capable of tolerating collusion by requiring for each lookup,
put, join and leave operation O(logN) latency and only O(logN) messages.
In the remaining of the paper, we discuss related work in Section 2 and then present
the system and adversary models in Section 3. Description of the architecture is given in
Section 4, together with an analysis of the churn impact. Robustness against malicious
behaviours (coordinated or not) is studied in Section 5. Results of simulations are presented
in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Related Work
In the following, we first review related work that focuses on robustness against malicious
peers and then examine policies to handle high churn.
Regarding robustness to malicious behaviour, different approaches have been proposed,
each one focusing on a particular adversary strategy. Regarding eclipse attacks, a very
common technique, called constrained routing table, relies on the uniqueness and impossibil-
ity of forging peers’ identifiers. It consists in selecting as neighbours only the peers whose
identifiers are closer to some particular points in the identifier space [3]. Such an approach
has been successfully implemented into several overlays (e.g., CAN, Chord, Pastry). More
generally, to prevent messages from being misrouted or dropped, the seminal works on DHT
routing security by Castro et al. [3] and Sit and Morris [21] combine routing failure tests and
redundant routing as a solution to ensure robust routing. In [16] we extend their approach
to cope with colluders by constraining the result of a query, which guarantees to reach the
legitimate recipient with high probability. However, in both approaches, the topological
properties of their overlay do not guarantee that redundant paths are independent. Fiat
et al. [7] use the wide paths technique initially proposed by Hildrum and Kubiatowicz [10].
All these solutions require all DHT nodes to maintain O(log2N) links to other nodes, and
require for each operation O(log3N) messages.
With regard to churn, Li and al. [11] show through a comprehensive performance eval-
uation that structured overlays (such as Tapestry, Chord, or Kademlia) can achieve similar
performance with regard to churn if their parameters are sufficiently well tuned. However,
these protocols do not focus on reducing the frequency at which routing tables are updated.
Such an approach has been proposed in the eQuus architecture [12], in which nodes which
are geographically close to each other are grouped into the same cliques to form the vertices
of the hypercube. EQuus offers good resilience to churn and good data availability, however
relying on local awareness to gather peers within cliques makes this architecture vulnerable
to adversarial collusion and geographically correlated failures.
3 Model
3.1 System Model
Peers are assigned unique random identifiers from an m-bit identifier space when they join
the system. Identifiers (denoted ID) are derived by using the standard MD5 hash func-
tion [17], on the peers’ network address. We take the value of m large enough to make the
probability of identifers collision negligible. Each application-specific object, or data-item, of
the system is assigned a unique identifier, called key, selected from the same m-bit identifier
space. Each peer p owns a fraction of all the data items of the system. Data items and peers
are mapped by a closeness relationship detailed in Section 4.2. In the following, we will
use the term peer (or key) to refer to both the peer (or key) and its m-bit representation.
Regarding timing assumption, we assume an asynchronous model. Rational of this assump-
tion is that it matches communication delays over the Internet, and it makes difficult for
malicious peers to devise strategies that could have been exploited in a synchronous timing
model, such as DoS attacks [14].
3.2 Adversary Model
Some peers try to manipulate the system by not following the prescribed protocols and by
exhibiting undesirable behaviours. Such peers are called malicious. Malicious peers can drop
messages or forward requests to illegitimate peers. Malicious peers may act independently
or may be part of a collusion group. A peer which always follows the prescribed protocols is
said to be correct. We assume that there exists a fraction µ, (0 ≤ µ < 1), of malicious peers
in the whole system. Malicious peers are controlled by a strong adversary. The adversary
can issue join requests for its malicious peers in an arbitrary manner. At any time it can
inspect the whole system and make its malicious peers re-join the system as often as it
wishes.
We assume the existence of a public key cryptography scheme that allows each peer to
verify the signature of each other peer. We also assume that correct peers never reveal their
private keys. Peers IDs and keys are part of their hard coded state, and are acquired via a
central authority [5]. When describing the protocols, we ignore the fact that messages are
signed and recipients of a message ignore any message that is not signed properly. We also
use cryptographic techniques to prevent a malicious peer from observing or unnoticeably
modifying a message sent by a correct peer. However a malicious peer has complete control
over the messages it sends and receives. Note that messages physically sent between any
two correct peers are neither lost nor duplicated.
4 Architecture Description
As discussed before, our architecture is based on a hypercubic topology. The hypercube is
a popular interconnection scheme due to its attractive topological properties, namely, low
node degree and low network diameter. Beyond these properties, a hypercube offers two
important topological features, i.e. recursive construction and independent paths.
4.1 Background
This section presents some preliminaries related to the hypercubic topology. For more
details the reader is invited to read Saad and Schultz [19]. A d-dimensional hypercube,
or d-hypercube for short, consists of 2d vertices, where each vertex n is labelled by its d-
bits representation. Dimension d is a fundamental parameter since it characterises both
the diameter and the degree of a d-hypercube. Two vertices n = n0 . . . nd−1 and m =
m0 . . .md−1 are connected by an edge if they share the same bits but the i
th one for some
i, 0 ≤ i < d, i.e. if their Hamming distance H(n, m) is equal to 1. In the following, the
notation n = mi stands for two vertices n and m whose labels differ only by their bit i.
Property 1 (Recursive Construction [19]). A d-hypercube can be constructed from lower
dimensional hypercubes.
The construction consists in joining each vertex of a (d − 1)-hypercube to the vertex
of the other (d − 1)-hypercube that is equally labelled, and by suffixing all the labels of
the vertices of the first (d − 1)-hypercube with 0 and those of the second one with 1. The
obtained graph is a d-hypercube. From this construction, we can derive a simple distributed
algorithm for building a d-hypercube from a (d−1) one. This algorithm consists in splitting
each peer of the (d− 1)-hypercube into two peers, in suffixing the labels of the two obtained
peers respectively by 0 and 1, and in updating the link structure to map the d-hypercube.
Interestingly, this simple algorithm involves only 2 messages per link updated whatever the
dimension of the considered system, and thus has a message complexity of O(d) per peer.
Property 2 (Independent Routes [19]). Let n and m be any two vertices of a d-hypercube.
Then there are d independent paths between n and m, and their length is less than or equal
to H(n, m) + 2.
Two paths are independent if they do not share any common vertex other than the source
and the destination vertices. In a d-hypercube, a path from vertex n to vertex m is obtained
by crossing successively the vertices whose labels are obtained by modifying one by one n’s
bits to transform n’s label into m’s one. Suppose that H(n, m) = b. Then b independent
paths between n and m can be found as follows: path i is obtained by successively correcting
bit i, bit i + 1, . . ., bit (i + b− 1) mod b among the b different bits between n and m. Note
that these b paths are of optimal length H(n, m). In addition to these paths, d− b paths of
length H(n, m) + 2 can be constructed as follows: path j of length H(n, m) + 2 is obtained
by modifying first bit j on which n and m agree, and then by correcting the b different bits
according to one of the b possibilities described previously, and finally by re-modifying bit
j. The ability to construct independent paths is an important property since it allows the
peer-to-peer system to have alternative paths to tolerate faulty peers. Indeed, if the faulty
peers are uniformly distributed in the system, then the probability of encountering a faulty
peer decreases exponentially with the number of independent paths [22]. Finally, finding
shortest length paths minimises the probability of encountering malicious peers.
4.2 PeerCube in a Nutshell
We now present an overview of PeerCube features. Basically, our architecture has two main
characteristics: peers sharing a common prefix gather together into clusters ; and clusters
self-organise into a hypercubic topology.
4.2.1 Clusters
As stated before, each joining peer is assigned a unique random ID from an m-bit identifier
space. Assigning unique random IDs to peers prevents the adversary from controlling a
portion of the network, since peers are spread wide over the network according to their
identifier as follows. Peers whose ID share a common prefix gather together within the same
cluster. Each cluster is uniquely identified with a label that characterises the position of the
cluster in the overall hypercubic topology1. The label of a cluster is defined as the shortest
common prefix shared by all the peers of that cluster such that the non-inclusion property
is satisfied. The non-inclusion property guarantees that a cluster label never matches the
prefix of another cluster label, and thus ensures that each peer in PeerCube belongs to at
most one cluster. The non-inclusion property is defined as follows:
Property 3 (Non-Inclusion). If a cluster C labelled with b0 . . . bd−1 exists then no cluster
C′ with C′ 6= C whose label is prefixed with b0 . . . bd−1 exists.
The length of a cluster label, i.e. the number of bits of that label, is called the di-
mension of the cluster. In the following, notation d-cluster denotes a cluster of dimension
d. Dimension determines an upper bound on the number of links a cluster has with other
clusters of the overlay, i.e. the number of its neighbours. Peers of a d-cluster C maintain
a routing table RT such that entry RT [i], with 0 ≤ i < d, points to peers belonging to
one of the d closest clusters to C. (Distance notion is detailed in Section 4.2.2.) References
to clusters that point toward C are maintained by C’s members in a predecessor table PT .
Note that maintaining such a data structure is not mandatory, i.e. those clusters can be
easily found by the topological properties of PeerCube. However, keeping this information
makes the maintenance operations more efficient. Regarding data, all the peers of a clus-
ter are responsible for the same data keys and their associated data. As for most existing
overlays, a data key is placed on the closest cluster to this key. Placing a data key on all
the peers of a cluster naturally improves fault tolerance since this increases the probability
that this key remains available even if some of the peers fail. To keep this probability high,
the size of a cluster must not undershoot a certain predefined value Smin which depends on
the probability of peers’ failures. Finally, for scalability reasons, each cluster size is upper
bounded by a constant value Smax specified later on.
4.2.2 Hypercubic Topology
Clusters self-organise into a hypercubic topology, such that the position of a cluster into the
hypercube is determined by its label. Ideally the dimension of each cluster C should be equal
to some value d to conform to a perfect d-hypercube. However, due to churn and random
identifier assignment, dimensions may differ from one cluster to another. Indeed, as peers
may join and leave the system asynchronously, cluster C may grow or shrink more rapidly
than others. In the meantime, bounds on the size of clusters require that, whenever the size
of C exceeds Smax, C splits into clusters of higher dimensions, and that, whenever the size of
C falls under Smin, C merges with other clusters into a single new cluster of lower dimension.
1Henceforth, a cluster will refer to both the cluster and its label.
Finally, since peers IDs, and thus cluster labels, are randomly assigned, some of the labels
may initially not be represented at all. For all these reasons dimensions of clusters may
not be homogeneous. To keep the structure as close as possible to a perfect hypercube and
thus to benefit from its topological properties, we need a distance function D that allows to
uniquely characterise the closest cluster of a given label. This is obtained by computing the
numerical value of the “exclusive or” (XOR) of cluster labels [13]. To prevent two labels to
be at the same distance from a given bit string, labels are suffixed with as many bits “0”
as needed to equalise their size to m. This leads to the following distance function D. that
makes clusters that share longer prefixes closer to each other.
Definition 1 (Distance D). Let C = a0 . . . ad−1 and C′ = b0 . . . bd′−1 be any two d (resp.
d′) -clusters:
D(C, C′) = D(a0 . . . ad−10
m−d, b0 . . . bd′−10
m−d′) =
m−1
∑
i=0,ai 6=bi
2m−i
=
m−1
∑
i=0,ai 6=bi
2m−i (1)
Distance D is such that for any point p and distance ∆ there is exactly one point q such
that D(p, q) = ∆ (which does not hold for the Hamming distance). Finally, labels that have
longer prefix in common are closer to each other.
We are now ready to detail the content of a cluster’s routing table. Let C = b0 . . . bd−1
and Ci = b0 . . . bi . . . bd−1. Then, C’s i
th neighbour in PeerCube is cluster C′ whose label is
the closest to Ci.
Property 4. Let C be a d-cluster. Then, ∀i, 0 ≤ i < d, entry i of the routing table of C is
cluster C′ such that for each cluster C′′ 6= C′, D(Ci, C′) < D(Ci, C′′) holds.
By the distance D definition, it is easy to see that if for each cluster C in PeerCube the
distance between Ci and its ith neighbour is equal to 0 (with 0 ≤ i < d), then PeerCube
maps a perfect d-hypercube.
From Property 4, we have:
Lemma 1. Let C = b0 . . . bd−1 be a d-cluster. Then for all i, with 0 ≤ i < d, C’s i
th
neighbour is cluster C′ such that :
• C′ is prefixed with b0 . . . bi if such a cluster exists,
• C′ = C otherwise.
This can be seen by observing that, by definition of D, C′ shares the longest prefix
with Ci, that is at least the prefix b0 . . . bi. Otherwise C would be the closest cluster to C
i.
We exploit this property to construct a simple lookup protocol which basically consists in
correcting the bits of the source towards the destination from the left to the right.
4.3 Leveraging the Power of Clustering
Dimensions Disparity As described before, clusters dimensions are not necessarily equal
to each other. By simply setting Smax > log2N , we can make the dimensions disparity small
and constant. Indeed, observe that the dimension of a cluster is necessarily greater than
or equal to log2
N
Smax
. This follows from the fact that the minimum number of clusters
is N/Smax, which determines the minimum number of bits needed to code the label of a
cluster. Furthermore, by setting Smax > log2N , we can show by using Chernoff’s bounds
that the dimension of a cluster is w.h.p.2 lower than log2
N
Smax
+ 3. Indeed, since labels are
uniformly randomly assigned, setting Smax to a higher value decreases clusters dimension.
2In the following, with high probability (w.h.p.) means with probability greater than 1− 1
N
.
Thus distance δ between any two clusters dimensions is w.h.p. less than or equal to 3.3
Furthermore the number of non-represented prefixes is at most 23, which is very small with
regard to the total number of clusters N/Smax. Consequently, by setting Smax > log2N ,
PeerCube is very close to a (log2
N
Smax
)-hypercube, which guarantees PeerCube to enjoy the
attractive topological properties of a perfect hypercube of diameter log2
N
Smax
. Henceforth
Smax is in Θ(logN). Note that more details are given in the appendix.
Limiting the Impact of Churn We have just shown that by having peers self-organised
in an hypercube of clusters we get w.h.p. an overlay of diameter log2
N
Smax
. We now describe
how peers take advantage of that clustering to limit the impact of churn on the overall
system. Specifically, peers within a cluster are classified into two categories: core and spare
members. Only core members are in charge of PeerCube operations (i.e. inter clusters
message forwarding, routing table maintenance, computation of cluster view membership,
and keys caching). Size of the core set is equal to the minimal size of a cluster, i.e. constant
Smin. Core members form a clique, i.e., they point to each other. View of the core set is
denoted Vc. In contrast to core members, spare members are temporarily inactive, in the
sense that they are not involved in any of the overlay operations. They only maintain links
to a subset of core members of their cluster and cache the set of keys and associated data as
core members do. Within a cluster, apart from the core members that maintain the view Vs
of the spares set, no other peer in the system is aware of the presence of a particular spare,
not even the other spares of the cluster. As a consequence, routing tables only point to core
members, that is Smin references per entry are needed.
Achieving High Consistency By keeping the size of the core set to a small and constant
value, we can afford to rely on the powerful consensus building block to guarantee consistent
routing tables among correct core members despite the presence of a fraction µ of Byzantine
peers among them. Briefly, in the consensus problem, each process proposes a value, and
all the non-faulty processes have to eventually decide (termination property) on the same
output value (agreement property), this value having been proposed by at least one process
(validity property). Various Byzantine consensus algorithms have been proposed in the
literature (good surveys can be found in [8, 4]). In PeerCube, we use the solution proposed
by Correia et al. [4] essentially because it provides optimal resiliency, i.e. tolerates up to n−13
Byzantine processes in a group of n processes, and guarantees that a value proposed only
by Byzantine processes is never decided by correct ones. Message complexity is in O(n3).
Note that in our context, n = Smin = cst.
4.4 PeerCube Operations
From the application point of view, three key operations are provided by the system: the
lookup(k) operation which enables to search for key k, the join operation that enables a
peer to join the system, and the leave operation, indicating that some peer left the system.
Note that the put(x) operation, that enables to insert data x in the system, is not described
since it is very similar to the lookup() operation. From the topology structure point of view,
three events may result in a topology modification: when the size of a cluster exceeds Smax,
this cluster splits into two new clusters; when the size of a cluster reaches Smin, this cluster
merges with other clusters to guarantee the cluster resiliency; finally, when a peer cannot
join any existing cluster because none of them matches the peer identifier prefix, then a
new cluster is created. For robustness reasons, a cluster may have to temporarily exceed
its maximal size Smax before being able to split into two new clusters. This guarantees
that resiliency of both new clusters is met, i.e both clusters sizes are at least equal to
Smin. A similar argument applies to the create operation. For this specific operation,
peers whose identifiers do not match any cluster label, temporarily join the closest cluster to
their identifier, and whenever Tsplit ≥ Smin temporary peers share the same prefix then they
create their new cluster. Threshold Tsplit is discussed in Section 4.4.2. These three additional
3Note that for a pure hypercube, the dimension disparity is log2N .
Upon lookup(k) from the application do
if (p.type 6= {core}) then
{q0 . . . q⌊(Smin−1)/3⌋} ← p.coreRandomPeer();
p sends (LOOKUP, k,p) to {q0 . . . q⌊(Smin−1)/3⌋}
else
C ← p.findClosestCluster(k);
p sends (LOOKUP,k,p) to a random subset of
⌊(Smin − 1)/3⌋ + 1 peers in C.coreSet;
enddo
Upon receiving (LOOKUP,k,q) from the network do
C ← p.findClosestCluster(k);
if (p.cluster.label= C) then
p sends (LOOKUP, k,q) to core members in C
if not already done;
data ← k’s data if cached otherwise null;
sends (k,C,data) to the originating q by using the reverse path;
else
p sends (LOOKUP, k,q) to a random subset of
⌊(Smin − 1)/3⌋ + 1 peers in C.coreSet;
enddo
findClosestCluster(k)
if (p.dim=0 or p.cluster.prefix(k)) then
C ← p.cluster;
else
C.label ← RTp(0).label;
for (i = 0 to p.dim − 1) do
if (D(k,RTp(i).label) < (D(k,C.label))) then
C.label ← RTp(i).label;
return C;
Figure 1: lookup Operation at Peer p
operations exploit the recursive construction property of hypercubes to minimise topology
changes, and rely on the Byzantine-consensus building block to achieve high consistency
among routing tables.
4.4.1 lookup Operation
In this section we describe how peer p ∈ C locates a given key k through the lookup
operation. Basically, locating k consists in walking in the overlay by correcting one by one
and from left to right the bits of p’s identifier to match k. By Lemma 1 and by distance
D, this simply consists in recursively contacting the closest cluster to k. In a failure free
environment, this operation would be similar to a typical lookup operation, except that if
the originator p of the lookup was a spare member, then p would forward its request to a
randomly chosen core member of C. Then the request would be propagated until finding
either a peer of a cluster labeled with a prefix of k, or no cluster closer to k than the current
one. The last contacted peer would return to the originating peer p either the requested
data if it exists, or null otherwise.
Now, suppose that malicious peers may drop or misroute requests they receive to prevent
them from reaching their legitimate destination. We adapt the lookup operation by using
the width path approach, commonly used in fault tolerant algorithms, which consists in
forwarding a request to sufficiently enough peers so that at least one correct peer receives
it. This is described in Figure 1. Specifically, a request is forwarded to ⌊(Smin − 1)/3⌋ + 1
randomly chosen core members of the closest cluster to the request destination, instead of
only one randomly chosen core member as in the basic lookup operation. In addition, in the
last contacted cluster C, when a core member p ∈ C receives the request, if p has not already
sent it to all core members of C then it does so and returns the response through the reverse
path. Hence, each peer that forwarded the request waits for a quorum of responses (i.e.,
⌊(Smin − 1)/3⌋ + 1) before propagating the response back in the reverse path. When the
originator q of the lookup request receives ⌊(Smin − 1)/3⌋ + 1 similar responses (k,data,C)
issued from peers whose ID prefix matches the one q initially contacted, then q can safely
use the received data. Otherwise, q discards it. It is easy to see that if there are no more
than ⌊(Smin − 1)/3⌋ malicious core members per cluster crossed, then a lookup operation
invoked by a correct peer returns the legitimate response.
Lemma 2. The lookup(k) operation returns the data associated to k if it exists, null oth-
erwise. This is achieved in O(logN) hops and requires O(logN) messages.
Proof. Let us first suppose a failure free-environment. Consider a peer p invoking lookup(k).
First, observe that since at each hop, the next contacted cluster is necessarily closer to k
than the current one, the lookup eventually terminates.
Let N ′ be the cluster of the core member returned by the lookup(k) operation. To
prove that N ′ is the closest cluster to k we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there
exists some cluster N ′′ such that D(N ′′, k) < D(N ′, k). By definition of D, if we denote the
position of the leftmost different bit between N ′ and N ′′ by i, it must be the case that N ′′
and k share their ith bit:
• N ′ = a0 . . . aiai+1 . . .
• N ′′ = a0 . . . aibi+1 . . .
• k = a0 . . . aici+1 . . .
By Property 3, i necessarily exists. Then since a cluster prefixed with a0 . . . ai exists
(N ′′), by Lemma 1 the ith neighbour N ′i of N
′ is prefixed with a0 . . . ai, that is N
′
i necessarily
shares its ith bit with k.
• N ′i = a0 . . . aia
′
i+1 . . .
Thus N ′i is closer to k than N
′ is. But by the algorithm, N ′ should have forwarded the
request for k to N ′i . This contradicts the assumption and thus proves the first part of the
lemma.
Let us now prove that the lookup stops after O(logN) hops. First, since the distance
to k stricly decreases at each hop, at least one bit is corrected. Second, from the distance
definition and by Lemma 1, bits are corrected from the left to the right, and a corrected bit
is never flipped again. Then the maximum number of hops is not greater than twice the
maximum dimension of a cluster (twice because of the reverse path). Since the dimension
of a cluster is w.h.p. at most log2N − log2Smax + 3 (see Lemma 17), the number of hops
needed to complete a lookup is w.h.p. in O(logN). Trivially, this operation requires O(logN)
messages.
In a failure prone environment, message redundancy is added. This redundancy impacts
only the number of messages required to complete the operation. Not its latency. By
construction, the request is no more forwarded to one peer at each hop, but to ⌊(Smin −
1)/3⌋+ 1 peers. Since . Thus since Smin is constant, this does not influence the failure free
operation asymptotic complexity. This completes the proof of the lemma.
4.4.2 join Operation
Recall that by construction each cluster C contains all the core and spare members p such
that C’s label is a prefix of p’s ID, and that each peer p belongs to a unique cluster. To
join the system, peer p sends a join request to a correct peer it knows in the system. The
request is forwarded until finding the closest cluster C to p’s ID. Two cases are possible:
either C’s label matches the prefix of p’s ID or the cluster N p should be inserted into does
not already exist (C is only the closest cluster to N ). In the former case, p is inserted into
C as a spare member. Inserting newcomers as spare members prevent malicious peers from
designing deterministic strategies to increase their probability to act as core member. In
the latter case, p is temporarily inserted into C until creation of N is possible, i.e., predicate
tempIsSplit() in Figure 2 holds. This predicate holds if there exist Tsplit temporary peers
Upon join(p) from the application do
{q0 . . . q⌊(Smin−1)/3⌋} ← findBootstrap();
p sends (JOIN,p) to q ∈ {q0 . . . q⌊(Smin−1)/3⌋};
enddo;
Upon receiving (JOIN,q) from the network do;
C ← p.findClosestCluster(q.id);
if (p.cluster= C) then
if (p.cluster.prefix(q.id)) then
p broadcasts (JOINSPARE,C,q) to p’s core set;
else
p broadcasts (JOINSTEMP,C,q) to p’s core set;
else
p sends (JOIN,q) to a random subset of
⌊(Smin − 1)/3⌋ + 1 peers in C’s core set;
enddo;
Upon delivering (JOINSPARE,C,q) from the network do;
/* each core member ∈ C executes this code once by the
broadcast properties */
Vs ← Vs ∪ q;
if (p.clusterIsSplit) then p.split();
N=p.findClosestCluster(q.id);
p sends (JOINACK,N ,state) to q ;
enddo;
Upon delivering (JOINSTEMP,C,q) from the network do;
/* each core member ∈ C executes this code once by the
broadcast properties */
p.temp← p.temp ∪ q;
if (p.tempIsSplit) then p.create(p.temp);
C′=p.findClosestCluster(q.id);
p sends (JOINACK,N ,state) to q ;
enddo;
Figure 2: join Operation at Peer p
in C that share a common prefix. Note that temporary peers do not participate in the cluster
life (they do not even cache data, contrary to spares), and only core members are aware of
their presence. Threshold Tsplit is introduced to prevent the adversary from triggering a
“split-merge” cyclic phenomenon. Indeed, a strong adversary can inspect the system and
locate the clusters that are small enough so that the departure of malicious peers from
that cluster triggers a merge operation with other clusters, and their re-joining activates
a split operation of the newly created cluster. Thus by setting Tsplit − Smin > ⌊
Smax−1
3 ⌋
with ⌊Smax−13 ⌋ the expected number of malicious peers in a cluster, probability of this
phenomenon is negligible. In both cases, i.e. whether p is inserted as spare or temporary
peer of C, p’s insertion is broadcast to all core members. The broadcast primitive guarantees
that if a correct sender broadcasts some message m, then all correct recipients eventually
deliver m once4. Peer p’s insertion in a cluster is acknowledged to p by all correct core
members of p’s new cluster via a JOINACK message which carries information (state) that
p needs to join its cluster (whether p is spare or temporary, and the required data structures,
if any). In all cases, a constant number of messages are needed. Thus message complexity
of a join is O(logN) which is the cost of the lookup for C.
Lemma 3. The join operation is insensitive to collusion. That is if before a join operation
in C the expected number of malicious peers in C is µ.Smin, then after a join in C the expected
number of malicious peers is still equal µ.Smin.
Proof. Straightforward from the join algorithm.
4PeerCube relies on the asynchronous Byzantine-resistant reliable broadcast of Bracha [2], whose time
complexity is in O(1) (the protocol runs in exactly 3 asynchronous rounds, where an asynchronous round
involves the sender sending a message and receiving one or more messages sent by recipients), and message
complexity is in O(n2). As for consensus, it is important to note that in our case n = Smin = cst.
leave(p) /* run by core member p upon q’s departure*/
Upon (q’s failure detection) do
if (q ∈ Vs) then Vs ← Vs \ {q};
else
p chooses Smin random peers R = {r1, . . . , rj} in Vs ∪ Vc;
{s1, . . . , sj} ← run consensus on R among Vc members;
/* the decision value is delivered at all core members */
p.leavePredTable() ;
Vs ← Vs ∪ Vc \ {s1, . . . , sj};
Vc ← {s1, . . . , smin};
p sends (LEAVE, Vc) to all spare members ∈ Vs;
p.leaveRoutingTable();
enddo;
Figure 3: leave Operation at Peer p
4.4.3 leave Operation
The leave operation is executed when a peer q wishes to leave a cluster or when q’s failure
has been detected. Note that in both cases, q’s departure has to be detected by ⌊(2Smin +
1)/3⌋ + 1 core members so that a malicious peer cannot abusively pretend that some peer
q left the system. Thus, when core members detect that q left, two scenarios are possible.
Either q belonged to the spare set, in which case, core members simply update their spare
view to reflect q’s departure, or q belonged to the core set. In the latter case, q’s departure
has to be immediately followed by the core view maintenance to ensure its resiliency (and
thus the cluster resiliency). To prevent the adversary from devising collusive scenario to
pollute the core set, the whole composition of the core set has to be refreshed. Indeed,
replacing the peer that left by a single one (even randomly chosen within the spare set) does
not prevent the adversary from ineluctably corrupting the core set: once malicious peers
succeed in joining the core set, they maximise the benefit of their insertion by staying in
place; this way, core sets are eventually populated by more than ⌊Smin−13 ⌋ malicious peers,
and thus become – and remain – corrupted. This is illustrated in Section 5. Thus each core
member chooses Smin random peers among both core and spare members, and proposes
this subset to the consensus. By the consensus properties, a single decision is delivered to
all core members, and this decision has been proposed by at least one correct core member.
Thus core members agree on a unique subset which becomes the new core set. Note that in
addition to preventing collusion, refreshing the whole core set guarantees that the expected
number of malicious peers in core sets, and thus the number of corrupted entries in routing
tables is bounded by µSmin which is minimal:
Lemma 4. After a core member’s departure, the expected number of malicious peers in that
core is at most µSmin.
Proof. Consider a cluster C. Since IDs are uniformly randomly chosen, the expected fraction
of malicious peers in C is at most µ. When a core member leaves the cluster, Smin peers are
chosen randomly among all the peers of C. Thus, the expected number of malicious peers
included in the new core is at most µSmin.
An adversarial strategy is determined by the arrival or departure of a malicious peer at
a given time step.
Lemma 5. Upon a core member’s departure, for any randomized algorithm, there exists an
adversarial strategy such that the expected number of malicious peers in the core is at least
µSmin.
Proof. By Yao’s lemma [24], it is sufficient to prove that the lower bound holds for any
deterministic algorithm, on average, for some probability distribution over the adversar-
ial strategies (join/leave). Let us assume that the probability that a malicious peer joins
(resp. leaves) C is equal to the probability that a correct peer joins (resp. leaves) C. From
split(C) /* run by core member p in C*/
label0, label1 ← the two shortest non common prefixes
shared by at least Tsplit peers in C
for (i=0,1) do
Vci ← {q | q ∈ C’s core set and q’s prefix is labeli};
Vsi ← {q | q ∈ C’s spare set and q’s prefix is labeli};
p chooses Vi = Smin− | Vci | random peers from Vsi
enddo;
(V
′
0 , V
′
1 )← run consensus on (V0, V1) among Vc members;
if (p ∈ V
′
0 ) then i = 0 else i = 1;
p updates its cluster label and dimension;
Vci ← Vci ∪ V
′
i ; Vsi ← Vsi \ V
′
i ;
p.splitRoutingTable() to update RT ;
p.splitPredTable() to update PT ;
p sends (SPLIT,label’i,state) to all peers in Vsi ;
Figure 4: split Operation at Peer p
Lemma 4.4.2 the expected number of malicious peers in the core is µSmin. Consider a de-
terministic algorithm that minimises the number of malicious peers in the core after a core
member p leaves. Such an algorithm would simply choose an arbitrary peer q in the spares
set to replace p (e.g. the one with the lowest ID as an arbitrary rule). Then, since malicious
peers join and leave C at the same rate as correct peers, the expected probability that the
leaving peer p is malicious is µSmin/Smin = µ. However, the expected probability that peer
q replacing p is malicious is µ. Hence, the expected number of malicious peers in the core
remains equal to µSmin.
Remark that because of the asynchrony of the system, some of the agreed peers si may
still belong to some views while having been detected as failed or left by others, or may
belong to only some views because of their recent join. In the former case, all the correct
core members eventually deliver the consensus decision notifying si’s departure, and new
consensus is run to replace it. Note that for efficiency reason, each core member can ping
the peers it proposes before invoking the consensus. In the latter case, si’s recent arrival is
eventually notified at all correct core members by properties of the broadcast primitive (see
join operation), and thus they insert si in Vs. Then each core member p notifies all the
clusters that point to C (i.e. entries of p’s PT table) of C’s new core set. Core members of each
such cluster can safely update their entries upon receipt of ⌊Smin−13 ⌋+1 similar notifications.
This is encapsulated into the leavePredTable() procedure in Figure 3. Similarly, all the
peers {s1, . . . , smin} are safely notified about their new state, and locally handle the received
data structures (invocation of leaveRoutingTable() procedure). Former core members
only keep their keys and the associated data. In all cases a constant number of messages
are exchanged for a leave.
4.4.4 split Operation
As discussed above, when the size of a cluster C exceeds the Smax threshold, then C has to
split into two new clusters. We exploit the recursive construction property of hypercubes to
achieve a split operation involving O(logN) messages.
When locally some core member p of a d-cluster C, with 1 ≤ d ≤ m, detects that the
conditions to split its cluster are satisfied (i.e., predicate clusterIsSplit holds) then p
invokes the split operation. Let a0 . . . ad′−1 and a0 . . . ad′−1, with d
′ > d be the shortest
non-common prefixes shared by C’s members identifiers (i.e., core and spare members).
The split operation is described in Figure 4. The first step consists in building the core
sets of the two new clusters C′ and C′′. Specifically, new core sets are prioritarily populated
with core members of C and then completed with randomly chosen spares of C. This is
handled as in the leave operation through consensus invocation by core members. The
second step consists, for each core member p ∈ C′ (similarly for p ∈ C′′), in updating its
views Vc and Vs by removing all the peers that do not anymore share a common prefix with
its new cluster, and similarly with data and associated keys (p keeps data closest to its new
cluster). Peer p sends to Vs members the label of their new cluster and the new core view.
Peers in Vs then remove any keys and associated data that do not belong to the cluster
anymore. The final step consists in updating routing tables of C′ and C′′, as well as the ones
that pointed to C prior to its splitting (i.e. entries in the predecessor table) as follows.
We adapt the distributed algorithm sketched in Section 4.1 to a imperfect hypercube as
follows: This procedure is referred as splitRoutingTable() in Figure 4. Consider w.l.o.g
cluster C′ = a0 . . . ad′−1 (the same argument applies for C′′). By construction of routing
tables, the (d′−1)th neighbour of C′ is set to C′′. Now, for all i = 0 . . . d−1, if the dimension
of the ith neighbour of C was greater than d, then the ith neighbour of C′ is found by invoking
lookup(C′i). Otherwise, the ith neighbour of C′ remains equal to the ith neighbour of C.
Finally, for all j, such that d − 1 < j < d′ − 1, the jth neighbour of C′ is set to C′ itself.
We now describe how routing tables of clusters that used to point to C are updated to
reflect the creation of the two new clusters C′ and C′′. Let Γ be the set of these clusters,
and | Γ |= k. Each core member p (at least each correct one) that used to be in C contacts
all q ∈ PredC [i].core, with 0 ≤ i < k. Then for each d′′-cluster Q = b0 . . . bd′′−1 ∈ Γ, let
i ≤ d′′ − 1 be the entry that referred to C. If Qi is closer to C′ than it is to C′′, then it is
set to C′, otherwise it is set to C′′. The routing tables of clusters that did not refer to C are
left unchanged. This procedure is referred as splitPredTable() in Figure 4. Note that the
split operation has been described by assuming the creation of two clusters. This can be
easily extended to k ≥ 2 clusters. This completes the split operation.
Lemma 6. Let C be some d-cluster that splits into two d′-clusters C′ and C′′, with d ≤ d′ ≤
m. If C satisfied Properties 3 and 4 prior to splitting, then both C′ and C′′ satisfy Properties 3
and 4.
Proof. We prove first that Property 3 holds. By assumption C initially satisfies Property 3.
Thus there is no cluster prefixed with C. Then after the invocation of split, C′ and C′′
are the only two clusters prefixed with C. From the split algorithm, C′ and C′′ differ by
their last bit. Thus neither C′ nor C′′ is prefixed with the other one. Thus C′ and C′′ satisfy
Property 3.
We now prove that Property 4 holds. Let us focus on cluster C′ (case for C′′ is similar).
Let C = b0 . . . bd−1, C′ = b0 . . . bd′−1, and C′′ = b0 . . . bd′−1. Observe first that as C′ and C′′
differ by exactly their (d′ − 1)th bit, C′′ is trivially the (d′ − 1)th neighbour of C′. Consider
now the jth neighbor of C′ such that d − 1 < j < d′ − 1. Since no cluster other than C′
and C′′ prefixed with C exists, no cluster prefixed with b0 . . . bd−1 . . . bj−1 exists. Then by
Lemma 1, the jth neighbor of C′ has to be set to C′ itself. Finally, consider the jth neighbor
of C′ such that 0 ≤ i ≤ d− 1. Two cases have to be considered. First, the dimension of that
neighbour cluster is smaller than or equal to d. By construction, the prefix of length d of
C′ is C. By the distance definition, that jth neighbour remains the closest cluster to C′i. In
the second case, by Theorem 2 the ith neighbour of C′ found by invoking lookup(C′i) is the
closest cluster to C′i.
Lemma 7. Let C be some d-cluster that splits into two d′-clusters C′ and C′′, with d ≤ d′ ≤
m. Let O be any d′-cluster different from both C′ and C′′. Then if O satisfied Properties 3
and 4 prior to the splitting operation, then O satisfies Properties 3 and 4 after that split.
Proof. An argument similar to the one used in Lemma 6 shows that Property 4 holds.
Let O be some d′-cluster, with 1 ≤ d′ ≤ m. Two cases are possible:
• O did not have C as neighbour. We show that O is not affected by C’s split. Let Ni
be some ith neighbour of O, with 0 ≤ i ≤ d′ − 1. Then by construction D(Oi,Ni) <
D(Oi, C). Since C′ is prefixed with C, by the definition of D, D(Oi,Ni) < D(O
i, C′).
The proof is similar for C′′. This shows that O is not affected by C’s split.
• O had C as neighbour, that is, there exists some i, such that the ith neighbour of O
was C. By construction, C was the closest cluster to Oi. By the split algorithm, only
C′ and C′′ are prefixed with C, and one of them is the new ith neighbour of O. Thus,
by the routing table update algorithm, Property 4 holds.
Lemma 8. The number of messages involved in the split operation is in Θ(logN).
Proof. Recall that a split proceeds in two steps: first a split message is sent to the peers
of the splitting cluster, second routing tables of the created clusters as well as the ones of
clusters that should point to them are updated. In the first step, since the size of a cluster
is in Θ(logN), the number of messages exchanged is obviously Θ(logN). In the second step,
two substeps are executed to update routing tables.
Consider a core member p of a splitting cluster C = b0 . . . bd−1. Denote by C′ =
b0 . . . bd−1 . . . bd′−1 the label of C′ after the split is completed and suppose that p ∈ C′.
First, the ith entry of the routing table of p is updated only when the dimension of the
cluster Ci initially referred by entry i of C is greater than the initial dimension d of C (see
Section 4.4.4). In this case, p executes lookup(C′i) and updates the entry to refer to the
found cluster. Actually, the lookup consists in correcting only the bits bd to bd′−1 of Ci up
to the split. Indeed, since Ci is already the closest cluster to Ci, only the d′ − d last bits
of Ci need to be corrected. But since w.h.p. dimensions d and d′ differ by only a constant
number, the lookup operation involves only a constant number of messages. Thus, since
only core peers handle routing tables and since the number of core peers is bounded by
a constant number, the number of messages exchanged when updating the entries of the
routing table is O(logN).
Second, p contacts the clusters in Γ initially pointing to C through pred. Since the cost
of pred is O(logN) and since only a constant number of peers per cluster (core members)
are involved in the procedure, this operation consumes O(logN) messages.
Thus the number of messages involved in a split is Θ(logN).
Lemma 9. After a SPLIT operation, the expected number of malicious peers in each core
is at most µSmin.
Proof. Consider a cluster C. Since identifiers are uniformly randomly chosen, the expected
fraction of malicious peers in C is at most µ. When C splits, since identifiers are randomly
assigned, the expected fraction of malicious peers in each core is µ. Similarly, the expected
fraction of malicious peers in each spares set is µ. Since the new cores are filled with
randomly chosen spares, the expected fraction of malicious peers in each core remains equal
to µ. Thus, the expected number of malicious peers in each core is µSmin.
Lemma 10. Upon a SPLIT operation, for any randomized algorithm, there exists an ad-
versarial strategy such that the expected number of malicious peers in the core is at least
µSmin.
Proof. By Yao’s lemma [24], it is sufficient to prove that the lower bound holds for any
deterministic algorithm, on average, for some probability distribution over the adversarial
strategies (join/leave). Let us assume that the probability that a malicious peer joins (resp.
leaves) C is equal to the probability that a correct peer joins (resp. leaves) C. Assume that
the expected number of malicious peers in the core prior to splitting is µSmin. Note first
that, after the SPLIT operation, since ids are randomly assigned, the expected fraction of
malicious peers in each core is µ. Consider a deterministic algorithm that minimises the
number of malicious peers in each core after a SPLIT operation. Such an algorithm would
simply choose arbitrary peers in the spares set to fill the core (e.g. the ones with the lowest
ids). Then, since malicious peers join and leave C at the same rate as correct peers, the
expected fraction of malicious peers among those chosen spares is µ. Hence, the expected
fraction of malicious peers in each core remains equal to µ.
4.4.5 merge Operation
We now describe how PeerCube is updated when the size of a cluster falls under Smin.
The merge operation is the dual to the split one, and incurs the same cost in terms
of number of messages exchanged. The merge consists in gathering the cluster that has
detected the need to merge with all the clusters that share the longest common prefix
with that cluster. Specifically, suppose that core member p ∈ C = b0 . . . bd′−1, locally
detects that its cluster size falls under Smin. First, p searches the set of clusters that
share as prefix the bit string b0 . . . bd′−1. This set, named Γ, is returned by invocation of
the function commonPrefix(b0 . . . bd′−1). This search function is based on a constrained
flooding approach. The constraint prevents a cluster from being contacted twice. It is
directly derived from the property of routing tables (Lemma 1). This makes this function
optimal in the number of messages exchanged, i.e. equal to the number of clusters prefixed
by the bit string. From the dimension disparity remark, the number of clusters that share
as prefix the bit string is constant. Thus a constant number of messages are sent during the
search. Secondly, p broadcasts to the other core members of C the fact that their cluster has
to merge with the clusters in Γ.
All the clusters Q ∈ Γ merge with C as follows. First, the core set of the cluster with
the lowest label in C ∪ Γ is kept as the core set of the new cluster, and spare members
from this cluster together with all the core and spare members of the other merging clusters
are included in the spare set of the new cluster. Both core and spare members update
their keys by copying those from the other merging clusters. Temporary peers belonging
to all the merging clusters keep their temporary status in the new cluster. Dimension d of
the new cluster is the lowest dimension so that Property 3 holds. Finding that dimension
comes to choose the value of the largest entry of C that does not point to itself. In most
cases, d = d′ − 1. The new cluster label N is N = b0 . . . bd−1. Second, routing tables of
merge(C) /* run by core member p in the d′-cluster C*/
Γ← p.commonPrefix(C);
p broadcasts (MERGE, Γ) to core members of C;
Upon delivery (MERGE,Γ) do
N .dim ← i | RT [i] 6= C ∧ (RT [i + 1] = C ∨ i ≥ d′);
N .label ← the leftmost first d bit of label of C;
V Nc ← V
C
c ; V
N
s ← V
C
s ; N .temp← C.temp;
for (each Q ∈ Γ) do
V Ns ← V
N
s ∪ V
Q
c ∪ V
Q
s ; N .temp← N .temp ∪ Q.temp;
p.mergeIncomingLinks();
p.mergeOutgoingLinks();
enddo
p sends (MERGRq, N , state) to each q ∈ V Ns ∪ temp;
enddo
Figure 5: merge Operation at Peer p
clusters that used to point toward the merging clusters C ∪ Γ are updated to reflect the
merge operation. Core members of each cluster Q ∈ Γ notify their predecessors (i.e., entries
of their predecessor table) to update the entry that used to point to Q so that it now
points to peers in the core set of the new cluster N . Note that regarding clusters that used
to point toward C, only label of C’s label has to be replaced by N ’s one. This function is
referred as mergeIncomingLinks() in Figure 5. Finally, N ’s routing table has to be created.
Specifically, if bit (d′−1) of C label is bit ”0” then N ’s routing table entries are set to entries
0 . . . (d−1) of C’s routing table. Otherwise N ’s routing table entries are set with the (d−1)
first entries of the (d′ − 1)th neighbour of C. In both cases entries d . . . (d′ − 1) do not exist
anymore. This function is referred as mergeOutgoingLinks() in Figure 5. This completes
the merge operation.
Lemma 11. Let C be some d′-cluster that merges with all the clusters of Γ into a unique
d-cluster C, with d < d′ ≤ m. Then, if all clusters satisfied Properties 3 and 4 prior to the
merge operation, then they all satisfy Properties 3 and 4 after the merge.
Proof. First note that, trivially, for all clusters O different from C′ and not in Γ, if O satisfies
Property 3 before the merge operation, then it satisfies it after the merge.
Let us now prove that C satisfies Property 3. First, since C′ satisfies Property 3, no cluster
prefixed with C′ exists. From the algorithm, all clusters prefixed with b0 . . . bd′−1 and C′
exists are merged in C. From the algorithm, d is the highest value such that the (d − 1)th
neighbor of C′ is not C′ itself. By Lemma 1, no cluster prefixed with b0 . . . bd−1 . . . bi′−1 for
all d + 1 ≤ i′ ≤ d′ − 1 exists. Therefore no cluster prefixed with C other than C itself exists.
Therefore C satisfies Property 3.
We now show that all clusters satisfy Property 4 after the merge operation. By assump-
tion, C′ and clusters of Γ satisfy Property 4 before merge. From the algorithm, C′ and all
clusters in Γ are prefixed with C. If the last bit of C′ is 0, then by the distance definition C is
closer to C′ than to any cluster in Γ. In constrast, if the last bit of C′ is 1 then the (d′ − 1)th
neighbour of C′ is the closest to C′′. Thus, after merge, C satisfies Property 4. Finally, since
C′ and all clusters in Γ are prefixed with C, each cluster that referred to C′ or to a cluster in
Γ still refers to C. This ends the proof.
Lemma 12. The number of messages incurred by a merge is Θ(logN).
Proof. Given a core member p of a merging cluster C′ = b0 . . . bd−1 . . . bd′−1. A merge consists
in contacting all the clusters prefixed with b0 . . . bd−1 . . . bd′−1, with d the new dimension,
and merging with them.
Thus by the same reasoning as previously, only a constant number of messages are
exchanged by commonprefix to crawl the appropriate clusters. To merge the clusters, all
the peers of each cluster are contacted. Thus the number of messages consumed is Θ(logN).
Routing tables are updated by copying the routing tables of the appropriate cluster. Thus
the routing tables updates is constant w.h.p.
As a consequence, the number of messages incurred by a merge is Θ(logN).
4.4.6 create Operation
The create operation enables to create a new cluster whenever sufficiently enough peers
that share a common prefix do not find a cluster that match their prefixes. This operation
consists in defining the label and the dimension of the new cluster N , in finding outgoing and
incoming links for N , and in transferring to N the closest keys to it. Specifically, when core
member p in C detects that temporary peers in its cluster satisfy predicate tempIsSplit(),
then p computes N ’s label as the shortest common prefix shared by those Tsplit temporary
peers. Then p randomly chooses Smin peers among those Tsplit peers and run consensus
with all the other core members of C to agree on N ’s core set; the other Tsplit − Smin peers
being N spare members. Remaining temporary peers in C that are closer to N than to C are
moved to N as temporary peers. Similarly for keys and associated data. Regarding outgoing
links, each core member of N creates a routing table containing d entries such that entry i
is filled with the closest cluster to N i. This is achieved through lookup invocations. This
construction is encapsulated in the createOutgoingLinks() procedure in Figure 6. Finally,
core members build their predecessor table by contacting all clusters that should point to
N . These clusters are returned by procedure pred(N ). This procedure is very similar
to the commonPrefix one except that all paths not connected to N are pruned from the
search.Note that both commonPrefix and pred procedure are detailed in [1]. Each returned
cluster updates its routing table accordingly.
Lemma 13. The create operation does not violate Properties 3 and Property 4.
Proof. Let C′ = b0 . . . bd′−1. From Theorem 2, C′ is the closest cluster to p. Let d be the
position of the first different bit between p and C′, that is p is prefixed with b0 . . . bd−1. Since
C′ is the closest cluster to p, no cluster prefixed with b0 . . . bd−1 = C exists. Thus C satisfies
Property 3.
From Theorem 2, the ith neighbor of C is the closest cluster to Ci for each 0 ≤ i ≤ d− 1.
Thus C satisfies Property 4. Finally, since pred returns all the clusters that should have
create(C) /* run by core member p in the d-cluster C*/
T ← set of the Tsplit temporary peers that share a prefix;
N .label ← shortest common prefix of T ’s members;
N .dim ← length of N .label ;
Vc ← Smin randomly chosen peers within T ;
V Nc ← run consensus on Vc among core members of C;
V Ns ← {q | q ∈ T \ V
N
c };
N .temp ← {q | D(q,N ) < D(q, C)};
p.pred(N);
p.createOutgoingLinks();
enddo
Figure 6: create Operation at Peer p
outgoing links to C, after create, all clusters other than C satisfy Property 4. This completes
the proof.
Lemma 14. The number of messages incurred by the create operation is in O(log2N).
Proof. Given a new cluster C. A create consists in updating the routing table of C and
of the concerned clusters. First, for each i = 1 . . . d, the ith entry of the routing table of
C is updated to refer to the cluster found through lookup(Ci). This operation costs in
sum O(log2N) messages. Second, clusters that must refer to C are contacted through pred
which consumes O(logN) messages. Then the number of messages incurred by a create is
O(log2N).
Theorem 1. Suppose that at some time t all the clusters of the system satisfy both Proper-
ties 3 and 4. Then, invocation of operations split, merge, or create does not jeopardize
any of these properties.
Proof. The theorem follows directly from Lemmata 6, 7, 12, and 13.
4.4.7 Bootstrapping PeerCube
Initially the system contains Smin well known peers grouped together in a bootstrap cluster.
That cluster has no label. We assume that no more than a fraction µ of these peers are
Byzantine. When a new peer p wishes to join PeerCube it sends its joining request to one
of those bootstrap peers5. Upon receipt of such a request, a bootstrap peer forwards it to
all other bootstrap peers, acknowledges p, and inserts p in a waiting list. Peer p knows that
its request has been accepted whenever it receives acks from ⌊Smin−13 ⌋ + 1 bootstrap peers.
When the size of the bootstrap cluster (i.e., number of bootstrap peers plus number of peers
in the waiting list) is such that there are at least i) Smin peers whose identifiers are prefixed
by “0”, and ii) Smin peers whose identifiers are prefixed by “1”, then the bootstrap cluster
splits into two new clusters C and C′. C (resp. C′) contains all the peers whose id is prefixed
by “0” (resp. prefixed by “1”). Label of C (resp. C′) is equal to the common prefix shared
by its members, typically “0” (resp. “1”). Peers state is build: each p ∈ C creates its routing
and predecessor tables, such that they both point to peers in C′. The same applies for peers
in C′.
5 Handling Collusion
5.1 Thwarting Eclipse Attacks
An eclipse attack enables the adversary to control part of the overlay traffic by coordinating
its attack to infiltrate routing tables of correct peers. As shown in the previous section,
5Note that we assume that p knows a correct peer. Otherwise there is no guarantee that p may ever join
the system. This is a classic assumption in P2P overlays
PeerCube operations thwart those attacks essentially by preventing colluders from devising
deterministic strategies to join core sets (i.e., newcomers are inserted as spare members) and
by reaching agreement among core members on any event that affects PeerCube topology.
Correctness of these operations relies on the hypothesis that no more than ⌊Smin−13 ⌋ mali-
cious peers populate core sets, that is the fraction of malicious peers in any core set is no
more than 1/4. Probability that such an assumption does not hold is now discussed. Let us
first compute the upper bound on the probability to corrupt a core set. This holds when the
clusters number is minimal (i.e. equal to N
Smax
). Denote by Xu the random variable describ-
ing the number of malicious peers in a cluster, and by Yu the random variable describing
the number of malicious peers in a core. Clearly, Yu depends on Xu. Since identifiers are
randomly chosen, inserting malicious peers into clusters can be interpreted as throwing µ.N
balls one by one and randomly into N
Smax
bins. The probability that x balls (malicious peers)
are inserted into a bin (cluster) is P (Xu = x) =
(
µ.N
x
) (
Smax
N
)x (
1 − Smax
N
)µ.N−x
. By the
leave operation, each departure from a core set is followed by the rebuilding of this set with
Smin randomly chosen peers among the Smax peers of the cluster. This can be interpreted
as picking simultaneously Smin balls among Smax balls among which x are black (malicious
peers) and Smax − x are white (correct ones). Thus, the probability of having y malicious
peers inserted in the core, knowing the number of malicious peers x in the cluster, is given
by P (Yu = y|Xu = x) =
(xy)(
Smax−x
Smin−y
)
(SmaxSmin)
. Finally, the tight upper bound on the corruption
probability is equal to
pu = 1 −
⌊
Smin−1
3
⌋
∑
y=0
µ.N
∑
x=0
P (Yu = y|Xu = x) P (Xu = x)
We now compute the lower bound on the corruption probability. This holds when the
number of clusters in PeerCube is maximal (i.e. N/Smin), and thus clusters’ population is
minimal. Let Xl be the random variable representing the number of malicious peers in a
cluster. Remark that Xl also represents the number of malicious peers in the core set. By
proceeding as above, P (Xl = x) =
(
µ.N
x
) (
Smin
N
)x (
1 − Smin
N
)µ.N−x
. Thus, the tight lower
bound on the corruption probability is
pl = 1 −
⌊
Smin−1
3
⌋
∑
x=0
P (Xl = x)
We can now derive upper and lower bounds on the probability that a request reaches its
legitimate destination. The probability that the number of hops of a request be h is equal
to
(
dmax
h
) (
1
2
)dmax
, with dmax = log2(
N
Smax
) + 3 the maximal dimension of a cluster. Such a
request is successful if none of the h clusters crossed by this request are corrupted. Thus its
probability of success is at least
dmax
∑
h=0
(
dmax
h
) (
1
2
)dmax
(1 − pu)
h
and at most
dmin
∑
h=0
(
dmin
h
) (
1
2
)dmin
(1 − pl)
h
with dmin, the minimum dimension of a cluster, is equal to log2(
N
Smax
).
Recall that the policy we propose to replace a left core member is to refresh the whole
composition of the core set by randomly choosing peers within the cluster. We opposed
this policy to the one which consists in replacing the core member that left by a single one
randomly chosen in the cluster (see Section 4.4.3). Figure 7 compares the lower bound on
the probability of successful requests with these two policies according to Smax, for different
ratio of malicious peers in the system, and considering N = 1, 000. The first observation
is that probability of success for the policy we propose (labelled by with randomisation
in the Figure) varies lightly with Smax value. This confirms that setting Smax > O(logN)
does not bring any additional robustness to PeerCube. The second observation is that for
the second policy (denoted by w/o randomisation), that probability drastically decreases
with increasing values of Smax, even for small values of µ. This corroborates the weakness
of such a policy in presence of a strong adversary.
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Figure 7: Probability of success of requests w.r.t. Smax
5.2 Robust Routing through Independent Routes
We have just seen that because identifiers are randomly assigned, the ratio of malicious peers
in some clusters may exceed the assumed ratio µ of malicious peers in the system, (note that
by our insertion algorithm, we guarantee that in expectation, the ratio of malicious peers in
core sets is equal to the one in clusters), and thus may impact the resilience of PeerCube.
Since pollution decreases with Smin (more precisely with ⌊(Smin −1)/3⌋) a possible solution
to increase the resilience is to augment Smin according to Smax, i.e. to have Smin in O(logN).
However, because of the Byzantine resistant consensus this makes maintenance operations
cost in O(logN3) or in O(logN2) because of the broadcast primitive. To circumvent this
issue, we extend Castro et al. [3] approach by sending a request over independent routes.
We adapt the independent routes construction algorithm presented in Section 4.1 to match
PeerCube features. Essentially, the search is adapted to find the closest cluster to the
theoretical one when this latter one does not exist. Denote by b the number of bit differences
between p’s identifier, the source of the request, and q’s identifier, the destination peer.
Recall that the ith route is obtained by successively correcting bits pi, pi+1, . . . , p(i+b−1) mod b
for 0 ≤ i ≤ b−1, with pi, pi+1, . . . , p(i+b−1) mod b the position of the b bits that differ between
p and q. We modify this procedure by invoking the lookup operation on keys obtained by
successively correcting bits pi, pi+1, . . . , p(i+b−1) mod b for 0 ≤ i ≤ b − 1. Other independent
routes of non-optimal length are found by modifying first, one bit on which p and q both
agree (say ni), by looking for the closest cluster to that key, then by finding independent
routes from that cluster by proceeding as above, and finally by re-modifying ni.
Lemma 15. The independent routes algorithm finds at least log2
N
Smax
independent routes
of length O(logN) w.h.p.
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Figure 8: Probability of success of requests
Proof. Consider a d-cluster C = b0 . . . bd−1. Consider the minimal dimension dmin of clusters.
Then all the clusters are labelled with a prefix of length at least dmin; that is for all the
labels of the clusters, at least dmin bits positions are always fully represented. Denote such
bits positions by P (card(P) = dmin). Then for some k ∈ P , each lookup(Ck) invocation
necessarily returns a cluster Ck such that its kth bit is bk and its ith bit is bi for all i ∈ P .
Thus the algorithm can be reduced to the standard independent routes construction in a
perfect (dmin)-hypercube. That is the number of independent routes is at least dmin which
is greater than log2N − log2Smax.
Second, note that each lookup(Ck) procedure call in the independent routes algorithm
incurs more than 1 hop only when the dimension of the closest cluster to Ck is greater than
the dimension of the current cluster (to correct the remaining bits). Indeed, if that is not
the case, the closest cluster to Ck is simply the kth neighbour of the current cluster (this
can be seen by recurrence). Consequently, since the maximum dimension difference is w.h.p.
equal to 8, each lookup operation call in the algorithm consumes O(1) number of messages.
That is w.h.p. each independent route consumes O(logN) messages.
We now examine the probability psucc for a request issued by a correct peer to reach
its legitimate destination when that request is sent over r independent routes of length h,
with dmin ≤ r ≤ dmax. The request is successful if at least one route does not contain
any corrupted cluster. Let p denote the exact probability that a cluster is corrupted, i.e.
pl ≤ p ≤ pu. The probability of success of a request using r independent routes of length h
is 1 −
(
1 − (1 − p)h
)r
. Thus probability psucc is lower bounded by
dmax+2
∑
h=0
(
dmax + 2
h
)(
1
2
)dmax+2 (
1 −
(
1 − (1 − pu)
h
)r)
and upper bounded by
dmin
∑
h=0
(
dmin
h
) (
1
2
)dmin (
1 −
(
1 − (1 − pl)
h
)r)
Term dmax+2 in the first equation comes from the non-optimal paths of the independent
routing algorithm. Figure 8 shows the remarkable increase in PeerCube robustness when
using independent routes w.r.t. to a single route. Note also that whatever the percentage of
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Figure 9: Benefit of hot spares in PeerCube is displayed through the number of routing tables
updates
malicious peers in the system the probability of success degrades gracefully (logarithmically)
with respect to N .
6 Simulation
In this section, we present the results of an experimental evaluation of PeerCube performed
on PeerSim a simulation platform for P2P protocols. The simulation is event based. The
workload is characterised by the number of and arrival/departure pattern of peers and by
the distribution of requests they issue. Each experiment uses a different workload.
Churn Impact In these experiments, we study the ability of PeerCube to greatly reduce
the impact of high dynamics on peers load. In particular, we analyse the benefit drawn
from appointing newcomers as spare members on the number of routing tables updates.
In Figure 6, the number of routing tables updates in a network of up to 10,000 peers is
depicted. Bursts of joins and leave are cyclically generated. Smax = 13, and Smin = 4.
A failure-free environment is assumed. The dotted curve shows the number of triggered
routing tables updates in a cluster-based hypercubic topology in which all clusters members
actively participate in the overlay operations (denoted by PeerCube without core/spare
classification in the figure), while the solid curve depicts the number of routing tables
updates generated in PeerCube (denoted by PeerCube). As expected, using newcomers
as hot spares drastically reduces the number of routing tables updates for both joins and
departures events. For instance, the burst of joins generated during simulation time 27,000
and 27500 have triggered no routing tables updates for PeerCube while it has given rise to
50,400 updates for PeerCube without core/spare classification.
Robustness against Collusion In these experiments, we test the ability of PeerCube to
achieve a robust lookup operation despite the presence of a strong adversary. As described
in the previous section, robust lookup is realized by two techniques. First, by preventing
malicious peers from strategizing to get inserted within core sets; through the randomization
insertion algorithm, we minimize the ratio of malicious peers into routing tables. Second,
by taking advantage of independent and optimal length paths offered by the hypercubic
topology to guarantee that a request sent by a correct peer reaches its legitimate destination
with probability close to 1. Figure 10 shows for N = 1, 000 peers, the probability of successful
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Figure 10: Probability of success wrt malicious peers
requests sent by correct peers w.r.t. to the ratio of malicious peers in the system. The main
observation is that experiments fully validate theoretical results. Namely, for up to 15% of
malicious peers, 98% of the requests issued from correct peers are successful, and for 25%
of malicious peers, in average, 90% of the requests are successful, which clearly emphasises
PeerCube robustness to co-ordinated malicious behaviour.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented PeerCube, a DHT-based system that is able to handle high
churn and collusive behavior. Many existing P2P systems exhibit some fault tolerance or
churn resiliency. The main contribution of PeerCube is to combine existing techniques from
classical distributed computing and open large distributed systems in a new way to efficiently
decrease churn impact and to tolerate collusion of malicious peers as shown analytically and
validated through experimental simulation. For future work, we are planning to study
strategies against a computationally unbounded adversary, that is an adversary, beyond
being able to inspect the whole system and issue join and leave requests as often it wishes
(as studied in this paper), can carefully choose the IDs of the Byzantine peers, so that it
can place them at critical locations in the network [7, 20].
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Appendix
8 Dimensions Disparity in PeerCube
The next lemmata give (probabilistic) bounds on the dimensions of clusters according to
the maximal size Smax of the clusters.
Lemma 16. The dimension of a cluster is greater than log2N − log2Smax.
Proof. The minimum dimension is given by the minimum number of bits needed to code the
labels of the clusters. Note that the lower the number of clusters, the lower the dimensions
of these clusters (the lower the minimum number of bits needed to code them). Since
the maximum number of peers per cluster is Smax, the minimum number of clusters is
N/Smax. Thus, the minimum number of bits needed to code the label of a cluster is log2N −
log2Smax.
Lemma 17. If Smax ≥ log2N , w.h.p. the dimension of a cluster is lower than log2N −
log2Smax + 3.
Proof. Let D be the random variable representing the dimension of a cluster, and Xd be the
random variable that represents the number of peers suffixed with a bit string of length d.
Then if the dimension of the cluster is greater than d, the number of peers suffixed with the
string of length d is greater than Smax. Thus Prob(D > d) ≤ Prob(Xd > Smax).
By assumption, peers identifiers are assigned uniformly randomly. Thus Xd follows a
binomial law of parameters N and 12d where
1
2d is the probability that a peer is suffixed with
a string of length d. Thus by the Chernoff’s upper bound, for Smax >
N
2d
:
Prob(D > d) ≤




eSmax
2
d
N
−1
(
2d
N
Smax
)
2d
N
Smax




N
2d
≤
eSmax−
N
2d
(
2d
N
Smax
)Smax
≤
eSmax
(
2d
N
Smax
)Smax
.
If we suppose that 2
d
N
Smax ≥ 2e, then Prob(D > d) ≤
1
2Smax . It follows that, if
d > log2N − log2Smax + log2(2e) and if Smax ≥ log2N , then we have Prob(D > d) ≤
1
N
.
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Let δ be the difference between the dimensions of any two clusters. If
Smax ≥ log2N , then 2δ ≤ 8 w.h.p.
Proof. This follows from lemmata 17 and 16.
Proposition 2. If Smax ≥ log2N , the number of non-represented prefixes is w.h.p. at most
8.
Proof. Since w.h.p the dimension of a cluster is lower than log2N − log2Smax + 3, the
number of non-represented prefixes is maximal when the dimensions of the clusters are all
log2N − log2Smax + 3 and the number of clusters is minimal (N/Smax). Since the minimal
number of bits needed to code N/Smax clusters is log2N − log2Smax, the number of non-
represented prefixes is at most 23 = 8.
9 commonprefix and pred Procedures
9.1 commonprefix Procedure
The commonprefix procedure is used for contacting all the clusters prefixed with a given
bit string b0 . . . bi. It guarantees that each cluster prefixed with b0 . . . bi is crossed once and
only once. This makes commonprefix optimal in messages number, i.e., the number of sent
messages is equal to the number of clusters prefixed by b0 . . . bi. This procedure is based on
a constrained flooding approach. The constraint avoids messages redundancy, and is derived
from the property of routing tables (Lemma 1).
Suppose that some peer p ∈ C wishes to find all clusters that share a common prefix with
C. Let b0 . . . bi be that common prefix. Let d′ ≥ i + 1 be C’s dimension. Then p proceeds as
follows. For k = i+1, . . . , d′−1, p sends a commonprefix(b0 . . . bi, k) message to an arbitrary
core member of the kth entry of its routing table. When a core member q receives such a
request, it sends back to p his identifier, and proceeds as above by forwarding this request
to a random core member of the k′th entry of its routing table with k′ = k + 1, . . . , d′′ − 1,
with d′′ the dimension of q’s cluster. If d′′ = k + 1, q does not forward the request to its
neighbours.
Lemma 18. An invocation of commonprefix(b0 . . . bi) contacts once and only once all clus-
ters prefixed by b0 . . . bi.
Proof. Let C0 be a d-cluster b0 . . . bibi+1 . . . bd−1 initiating a commonprefix(b0 . . . bi) proce-
dure call. We first show that all clusters prefixed by b0 . . . bi are contacted. Consider a
d′-cluster C′ = b0 . . . biai+1 . . . ad−1. By the algorithm and by Property 4, each bits bj , for
j > i of C0 is eventually flipped to aj . Since a corrected bit is never flipped again C′ is
eventually contacted.
We now prove that clusters are contacted only once. Briefly, the proof consists in showing
that if a cluster is contacted by two different clusters then this cluster has two incompatible
prefixes (i.e., none of them is a prefix of the other one).
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that some cluster C′ prefixed by b0 . . . bi is con-
tacted by two different clusters Aj and Bk. Then it must be the case that two routes P1
and P2 exist between C and C′ with P1 = C0 . . .ClA0 . . .AjC′ and P2 = C0 . . . ClB0 . . .BkC′.
Note that C0 is not necessarily different from Cl. Suppose that A0 (resp. B0) is the i′th
(resp. i′′th) neighbour of Cl (i.e., bit i
′ is the first bit that differs from A0 and Cl.). Thus,
from Lemma 1, the i′th bit of A0 is different from the i′th bit of B0. From the algorithm,
all the clusters traversed from A0 to C′ must share the same prefix of length i′ + 1, i.e., the
prefix b0 . . . bi . . . ai′ . Similarly for all the clusters traversed from B0 to C′ that must share
the same prefix of length i′′ + 1, i.e., prefix b0 . . . bi . . . ai′ . . . ai′′ . Which is impossible as C′
cannot share both prefix b0 . . . bi . . . ai′ and prefix b0 . . . bi . . . ai′ . . . ai′′ . This concludes the
proof.
Lemma 19. Let b0 . . . bd−1 some cluster label. The number of messages incurred by
commonprefix(b0 . . . bd−1) is constant w.h.p.
Proof. By Lemma 18, commonprefix crosses each cluster prefixed with b0 . . . bd−1 exactly
once. Let C be the cluster prefixed with b0 . . . bd−1 of which the dimension is the greatest one
among all clusters prefixed with b0 . . . bd−1. Let δ be the difference between C’s dimension
and d. Then the number of clusters crawled by commonprefix(b0 . . . bd−1,-) is at most 2
δ.
Thus, if d represents the dimension of a cluster labelled b0 . . . bd−1, then by Proposition 1
the number of clusters crawled by commonprefix is O(1) w.h.p. Finally, since only core
members are involved in commonprefix and since the number of core peers per cluster is
constant, the number of messages incurred by commonprefix is w.h.p. constant.
9.2 pred Procedure
We now describe how peers of a given d-cluster C locate all clusters that have outgoing links
to C through the pred procedure. The procedure is similar to commonprefix except that all
routes not connected to C are pruned. Suppose that some peer p ∈ C wishes to locate all
the clusters that have an outgoing link to C . Then p proceeds as follows:
1. For each 0 ≤ i ≤ d − 1, p sends a pred(C, E ,i) message to its ith neighbour Ci. The
set E indicates the entries of p’s routing table that refer to C itself.
2. If Ci has an outgoing link to C, then q ∈ Ci sends a feedback message to C. In all cases
q forwards pred(C, E , i′) to its neighbor r ∈ Cii′ for each i′ > i such that either i′ ∈ E
or i′ > d.
3. r ∈ Cii′ in turn executes Step 2 unless i′ is equal to the dimension of Cii′ .
We can state the following lemma.
Lemma 20. Let p ∈ C such that p invokes pred(). Then all the clusters that have outgoing
links to C are contacted once and only once.
Proof. Note first that, in the algorithm, if the condition “i′ ∈ E or i′ > d” was removed,
the algorithm would be equivalent to a commonprefix procedure on a prefix of length 0. By
Lemma 18, all the clusters of the system would be contacted once and only once. To prove
that all clusters that have outgoing links to C are contacted, it suffices to prove that all the
clusters that do not satisfy this condition cannot have any outgoing link to C.
First consider any two clusters A and B, and denote by i the position of the first different
bit between A and B. Then A has an outgoing link to B if and only if B is the ith neighbor
of A. Indeed by Lemma 4 for any j 6= i the jth neighbor of A (if it is not A) differ with
B by at least its min(i, j)th bit and thus cannot be equal to B. Thus, to prove that some
cluster A cannot have any outgoing link to some cluster B, it suffices to prove that B cannot
be the ith neighbor of A with i the position of the first different bit between A and B.
Now given a cluster C′ having received a pred(C,E,i) message. Let us show that for
each i′ > i s.t. i′ /∈ E the i′th neighbor C′i′ of C
′ cannot have any outgoing link to C. Note
first that from the algorithm, the first different bit between C′i′ and C is some j, such that
j ≤ i < i′. For simplicity, we assume that j = i
• C = a0 . . . ai . . . ai′ . . .,
• C′ = a0 . . . ai . . . ai′ . . .,
• C′i′ = a0 . . . ai . . . ai′ . . ..
But since i′ /∈ E , the i′th neighbor Ci′ of C is prefixed by a0 . . . ai . . . ai′ . Then we
necessarily have,
D(a0 . . . ai . . . ai′ , a0 . . . ai . . . ai′) < D(a0 . . . ai . . . ai′ , a0 . . . ai . . . ai′)
That is,
D(C′ii′ , Ci′) < D(C
′i
i′ , C)
Thus C is not the ith neighbor of C′i′ , with i the position of the first different bit between
C′i′ and C, and C
′
i′ cannot have any outgoing link to C.
Lemma 21. The number of messages incurred by pred is w.h.p. in O(logN)
Proof. Consider a d-cluster C invoking pred. To prove the lemma, it suffices to observe first
that the number of non-existing entries of C’s routing table is w.h.p. at most 8. Second,
the maximum difference between the dimensions of two clusters is w.h.p 3. Thus, each pred
message sent to a neighor of C, is forwarded at most O(1) times. Finally, since the number
of neighbor of C is O(logN), the number of messages consumed by a pred is O(logN).
